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ABSTRACT 
Privacy issues have hindered the evolution of e-health since its 
emergence. Patients demand better solutions for the protection of 
private information. Health professionals demand open access to 
patient health records. Existing e-health systems find it difficult to 
fulfill these competing requirements. In this paper, we present an 
information accountability framework (IAF) for e-health systems. 
The IAF is intended to address privacy issues and their competing 
concerns related to e-health. Capabilities of the IAF adhere to 
information accountability principles and e-health requirements. 
Policy representation and policy reasoning are key capabilities 
introduced in the IAF. We investigate how these capabilities are 
feasible using Semantic Web technologies. We discuss with the 
use of a case scenario, how we can represent the different types of 
policies in the IAF using the Open Digital Rights Language 
(ODRL). 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 
Security and Protection - access control; D.3.m [Programming 
Languages]: Miscellaneous; K.4.1 [Public Policy Issues]: 
Privacy; K.5.1 [LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTING]: 
Hardware/Software Protection - proprietary rights. 
General Terms 
Management, Design, Security, Human Factors, Standardization, 
Languages 
Keywords 
E-health, Semantic Web, ODRL, Privacy, Information 
Accountability 
1. INTRODUCTION 
E-health is the use of Information and communications 
technology (ICT) in healthcare. Amongst others, the Internet is 
the primary mode of communication for e-health applications. The 
Web is gradually transforming to what is called “the Semantic 
Web” where the traditional Syntactic Web is leveraged towards a 
distributed knowledge repository. The semantic web is based on 
the Resource Description Framework (RDF) [1] for metadata 
semantics and the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [2] for web 
ontologies. These technologies enable the development of Web 
based information systems that are capable of automated 
reasoning, impossible with the syntactic web. These capabilities 
open new avenues for e-health systems. But, with the use of the 
Internet to manage health information, the existing concerns in 
healthcare such as information security and informational privacy 
become paramount issues needing rigorous attention. This raise 
questions as to what the relevant security measures are and how 
an assurance of privacy can be given to the stakeholders (patients 
and healthcare professionals). In this paper we present an 
information accountability framework (IAF) for e-health systems. 
This framework will make applications such as the one proposed 
by Gajanayake et al. [3] practicable. We consider requirements of 
different stakeholders in healthcare and accordingly construct our 
IAF adhering to information accountability principles in the 
healthcare context.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section 
we will discuss privacy and its impact on e-health. In section 3 we 
give a brief account on information accountability and the 
principles behind the concept. In section 5, we present an IAF for 
e-health systems by extending an access control model from 
recent work which is summarised in section 4. Section 6 discusses 
how the introduced capabilities are attainable with available 
technologies. We will use a simple case scenario to operationalise 
the concept. 
2. E-HEALTH AND PRIVACY 
An eHR is a complete record of a patient’s medical history. They 
may also include information pertaining to sensitive concerns 
such as sexual health, mental health, addictions to drugs or 
alcohol, abortions etc. Hence unlawful disclosure of personal 
information could cause the subject of the information 
embarrassment and may affect insurability, child custody cases, 
and even employment [4, 5]. Therefore, informational privacy is 
vital to ensure the reliability of eHR systems. As a result patients 
demand strong security for their eHRs. Definitions for privacy 
come in many different forms. Alan Westin, in his book “Privacy 
and Freedom”, defines privacy as “the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others” [6], i.e. control of private information. A considerable 
degree of control over ones personal information is an essential 
aspect to protecting information privacy [7]. Due to the disparity 
of data ownership in healthcare, giving control of the data must be 
handled with care. 
Various methods have been proposed to address the privacy 
conundrum ranging from strict access control to privacy-
 
 
preserving algorithms. Access control mechanisms either permit 
or deny access, there are no intermediate states. They are not 
policy-aware and may also hinder the actions of legitimate users 
of an information system [8].  According to Kagal et al. [9] 
relying solely on access control mechanisms to guard information 
would be inadequate for privacy protection. 
Information accountability (IA) can complement access control 
mechanisms and support policy-awareness. The principles behind 
IA, in theory, would make sure that information users follow the 
appropriate rules and policies. To facilitate IA principles, systems 
should implement usage policies on its assets. Considering data in 
eHRs digital assets digital rights management (DRM) techniques 
can be used for the management of the data. Privacy policies in e-
health can be represented using an appropriate digital rights 
expression language (REL). Policies on the use of data in an eHR 
can be set by the patient, a trusted healthcare representative, a 
health authority or all the above. 
3. INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY 
Accountability systems lack formal foundations making it an 
attractive theme to many [10-13]. Jagadeesan et al. [10] assume 
that the relevant privacy policies exist and develop formal 
foundations for information accountability in terms of the privacy 
policies which define appropriate sharing of information among 
agents and provide algorithms that can be used by an auditor to 
check for compliance with rules. Weitzner et al. [14] propose a 
solution to the question of compliance of privacy policies by 
tracking all transactions and making them transparent hence 
creating an incentive for the users to abide by the rules.  They 
assume that appropriate policy rules exist with a formal 
representation, policy-aware transaction logs and a policy-
reasoning capability which would enable accountability systems 
to hold information users accountable for misuse. Focusing on the 
facts Weitzner et al. [14] put forth, Sloan et al. [13] address 
information accountability in terms of both social policies and 
technical aspects. They point out difficulties to developing 
accountability systems by stating that automated checking for 
compliance of privacy policy is a necessity for accountability 
systems and without the adequate foundations in both formal 
models and public policy issues they are unlikely to do so. They 
believe that policies required to developing accountability systems 
are informational norms and state that a proper balance between 
privacy requirements and competing concerns is necessary to 
sustain the architectural and social aspects introduced by Weitzner 
et al. [14]. 
Access control and accountability are closely related concepts. 
Access control is about restrictions, whereas accountability is 
about punishment. Hence for accountability systems, audit logs 
are essential [15]. Accountability systems facilitate fair use of 
information. Rather than prevention via rigid locks on data, 
accountability is about deterrence. The presence of an 
accountability mechanism delivers a threat of punishment which 
would deter users from intentional misuse. Accountability systems 
should facilitate transparency such that all relevant parties have 
the capability to observe how information is used and by whom. 
This makes bad acts visible and helps deter users from misuse 
[14]. The users of an accountability system should be well 
informed, i.e. a notification process where users are informed 
about underlying policies before an action occurs should be is in 
place. For example a user will be notified whether he is actually 
authorised to use a particular set of data he is trying to use and the 
ramifications if he proceeds regardless of the usage policies in 
place. This will also help in facilitating non-repudiation which is a 
significant aspect in information security. When holding someone 
accountable, the trustworthiness of the data about the 
inappropriate transaction is critical. Hence, provenance of data 
and metadata is a significant factor in information accountability. 
Electronic data does not have the necessary historical information 
that would help end-users, reviewers or regulators make the 
necessary verifications [16]. In an accountability system 
provenance can be facilitated using appropriate transaction logs. 
These transaction logs also serve another purpose in terms of 
accountability by being policy-aware. Policy-aware transaction 
logs can also facilitate policy reasoning capabilities and enable 
the users to reason about misuse and against claims of misuse.  
Creating proper incentives that would make consumers follow 
rules of accountability systems is important [13]. For an 
information user, the threat of punishment is an incentive to 
follow system rules. An incentive such as a strong assurance of 
privacy should be given to patients to prevent them from 
withholding information or enforcing rigid restrictions on data. 
3.1 Information accountability in healthcare 
In order to understand the concept of information accountability 
in healthcare, it is important to clearly identify the different 
parties in healthcare that can be held accountable, the issues for 
which a party can be held accountable and the appropriate 
mechanisms for accountability in healthcare [17]. Policies should 
be developed that address the different capabilities of roles within 
the industry. These policies should capture the requirements of all 
relevant parties. As stated above, in the healthcare domain it is 
difficult to define who owns health information. It is clear that 
patients are the subjects of health information. Patients are not 
always medical professionals; hence it is impossible to give them 
full control of their health information. Privacy policies should 
accompany an input from a professional health body such as a 
trusted medical practitioner or a central health authority. But is it 
important to balance between the patient’s privacy requirements 
and the requirements of the healthcare providers or the care givers 
(competing concerns). In a healthcare setting the patients privacy 
policies cannot contradict those set by the healthcare providers or 
the health authority. The IMIA code of ethics for medical 
information professionals [18] states under their first ethics 
principle; Principle of Information-Privacy and Disposition that 
“all persons have a fundamental right to privacy, and hence to 
control over the collection, storage, access, use, communication, 
manipulation and disposition of data about themselves”. A 
patient with an eHR, hence, should have the following 
capabilities; 1) the capability to allow a selected group of medical 
professionals to access the eHR, 2) the capability to hide certain 
health information from particular health practitioners who 
already have access to their eHR, 3) the capability to view and 
how the data in the eHR is used by authorised personnel, 4) the 
capability to inquire about potential misuse of data. The data 
consumers (health professionals and health authority) also have 
particular requirements. We can identify them as follows; 1) the 
capability to define security policies within the organization, 2) 
access to the relevant information in a non-restrictive and timely 
manner, 3) the capability to share patient health information with 
other health specialists, 4) the capability to override patients’ 
security settings in special circumstances (e.g. life threatening 
emergency situations, mental health related situations). It is 
important to note that usage policy enforcement might not always 
be beneficial to the patient. While fulfilling these privacy 
requirements under no circumstance must the health of the patient 
is compromised. A clear procedure for overriding usage policies 
in emergency situations should be defined. The nature of the 
healthcare domain may forces the implementation of a break the 
glass approach in emergency situations. The policy formulation 
process must consider the requirements of both parties. A 
compromise between these requirements must entail the final 
policy representation of the systems and the proper integration of 
these policies would improve patient confidence in the system. 
Apart from the requirements stated above, certain circumstances 
might requirement some health conditions be kept hidden from 
the patients. For example this may be the case for patients 
suffering from severe mental health conditions where the 
knowledge of particular illnesses may aggravate existing health 
conditions. They may also be considered unfit to manage their 
eHR. We acknowledge this eventuality but consider them as rare 
occurrences and do not integrate such capabilities in to the 
framework. However, in such cases the control over the patient’s 
eHR may be given to a custodian or a trusted health professional 
(HP) such as the patients GP who can take the patient’s role in 
controlling the eHR. 
4. PRIVACY ORIENTED ACCESS 
CONTROL FOR EHR 
Following is a brief description of the access control model in 
[19]. The model takes in to consideration the requirements 
discussed above. The basic protocol for the proposed access 
control system is illustrated in Figure 1. We assume that the 
patient has a comprehensive eHR under a relevant health 
authority.  
 
Figure 1. Privacy oriented access control model 
The eHR is formulated such that each type of data in the eHR 
(e.g. identity data, general health data, dental health data, mental 
health data, etc.) can be distinguished by eHR data type 
identifiers. For each of these data types there exists a set of 
predefined purposes for which the data can be used that are 
defined by a central health authority. The patient and the health 
authority can set privacy and access policies respectively. These 
two policies are later combined using the Policy Aggregation to 
form the final operational policy. The protocol for the policy 
formulation is as follows. 
The health authority defines intended purposes and sensitivity 
labels for each data type and element. We use object sensitivity 
labeling using a tree structure (a sensitivity tree (ST)) that has the 
eHR itself as the root element, the data types as children and data 
elements as grandchildren. A sensitivity label is not assigned to 
the objects themselves rather we relate the access level of a 
particular user (health professional) in terms of the sensitivity 
label of the data elements. Note that the sensitivity labels 
mentioned here are different from the classical hierarchical 
security levels found in MAC [20]. The nature of health 
information makes it difficult to define a clear hierarchical 
structure for the sensitivity of data elements that is general to all 
patients. For example, sexual health and mental health 
information may have the same sensitivity for some patients and 
may not be so for others. 
Definition:  A sensitivity label (SL) is a tuple <ASL, PSL>, where 
ASL = {asl1, asl2…asln} is a set of allowed sensitivity labels and 
PSL = {psl1, psl2…psln} is a set of prohibited sensitivity labels. 
ASL = {asli}; i = 1…n is denoted as all of the descendants of asli 
including asli. 
PSL = {pslj}; j = 1…n is denoted as all of the descendants of pslj 
including pslj. 
Example: Matt can access Gary’s mental health details but cannot 
access his Sexual or Dermatology details. The access level for 
Matt can be represented in terms of sensitivity labels as follows. 
SLMatt = < {eHR}, {Sexual Health, Dermatology Health} > 
Here we use the Denial-Takes-Precedence principle. Access is 
granted to the entire eHR and then access is denied to specific 
field by the PSL. This helps isolate the most sensitive information 
in the eHR that need to be hidden from certain users.  
The health authority uses a role-based access control module to 
set sensitivity level to health professionals. The sensitivity level 
defined by the health authority is different to the ones defines by 
the patients. PSLs set by the health authority will always be 
NULL. This is because the health authority is concerned with 
allowing access to data elements. The prohibitions are defined by 
the patients. The ASL set by the patients always precedes that 
which is set by the health authority. The ASL set by the health 
authority always precedes PSL set by the patients if there is a 
conflict. This feature will ensure that the relevant information is 
always available to the relevant health professional. 
5. INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY 
FRAMEWORK FOR E-HEALTH 
Here we present an information accountability framework (IAF) 
for e-health systems. It can be considered as an extension to the 
access control model described above. In the IAF the policies 
defined in the access control model act as the underlying policies 
to which the users must comply to but do not prevent users from 
accessing data. This is to facilitate unrestricted access to health 
information for authorised users. The reasoning capability of the 
IAF takes these policies in to consideration whist performing such 
tasks. 
 Figure 2: Schematic IAF architecture 
The IAF is divided in to two categories of services; external 
services and internal services and have three types of users; 
patients (P), a health authority (HA) and health professionals 
(HP). A schematic architecture is shown in the Figure 2. 
Internal services consist of a policy aggregation service, the 
information accountability services, a messaging service, a data 
service, policy storage and the EHR Purpose storage. External 
services of the IAF include patient services, health authority 
services, health professional services and the external EHR 
storage. Detailed descriptions of these services are given next. 
5.1 Internal services 
Information accountability services consists of policy storage 
(PSIAS), policy aware transaction logs (PATLIAS) and policy 
services containing a usage query service (UQSIAS) and a policy 
reasoning service (PRSIAS). PSIAS stores the policies it receives 
from the policy aggregator service. UQSIAS processes the usage 
queries it receives from health professional services requesting 
access to EHR data. Once the policy service receives an inquiry 
query from patient services PRSIAS send a request to the health 
professional service requesting a reasoning query for a particular 
information usage instance. The reasoning queries are processed 
with the use of PATLIAS which contains all past transactions of the 
system. 
Other internal services include a policy aggregator service 
(PASIS) which amalgamates the policies from PPSP and APSHA in 
such a way that the patient’s privacy requirements are met and the 
health authorities’ policies be satisfied, a data service (DSIS) 
which is the only component with access to the EHR storage, a 
messaging service (MSIS) which rends out the relevant messages 
to other services and an EHR purposes storage (EPSIS) which 
consists of the intended purposed of each of the data types in the 
EHR. The EPSIS is managed by HA. 
5.2 External services 
External services are used by the end users to give inputs to the 
internal services and receive results from them. External services 
consist of patient services, health authority services, health 
professional services and the EHR storage. 
Patient services are used by a patient to manage their EHR. The 
patient services consist of an access control service (ACSP), 
privacy policy service (PPSP), messaging service (MSP) and a 
usage inquiry service (UISP). A patient maintains an access 
control list (ACL) with the use of ACSP. The patients set their 
privacy policies using PPS and assign sensitivity levels for trusted 
health professionals in the ACL. These policies are then 
amalgamated by the policy aggregation service (PASIS) with the 
policies of the health authority and stored in PSIAF. Patients 
receive notifications and can send messages to HPs through the 
MSP from the internal services. Notifications include regular 
updates on the EHR, notifications of information access by HPs, 
warnings of potential information misuse and messages from HPs. 
All messages need to go through the internal services for them to 
be recorded in the Transaction logs. 
Health authority services are used by a central health authority to 
manage access settings for health professionals. Health authority 
services consists of a role based access control service 
(RBACSHA), an EHR purpose management service (EPMSHA) and 
access policy service (APSHA). The HA set minimum access levels 
for HPs using APSHA together with RBACSHA. These policies are 
combined with the patient’s privacy policies according to the 
access control protocol in [19], which is also summarised in 
section 3.  HA uses EPMSHA to manage the EHR purposes in 
EPSIS.  
Health professional services are used by health professionals to 
access patient EHR information. HPs are able to perform actions 
such as read and write. HPs are also able to initiate information 
sharing requests in order to share patient health information with 
other HPs to make informed decisions. Health professional 
services include a usage query service (UQSHP), a reasoning 
query service (RQSHP) and a messaging service (MSHP). HPs can 
lodge usage queries using UQSHP requesting access to EHR 
information. These queries contain purposes for which 
information is requires. The queries are processed by the UQSIAS 
and if policy compliant access. If the usage queries are not policy 
compliant a warning notification is sent to the requester at which 
point he can either comply with the warning or disregard it. If the 
warning is disregarded and the data is accessed by the HP, a 
message is sent by the MSIS to MSP notifying the patient of 
potential information misuse. At this point the patient may initiate 
a usage inquiry using UISP. As a result PRSIAS sends a request to 
RQSHP. The HP then has to send a justification of the use of 
information in the form of a reasoning query through the RQSHP. 
The justification is processed by the PRSIAS. If the provided 
justification is valid the incident is resolved. If not, further action 
(such as legal action) would be taken which we would not discuss 
in this paper (a justifiable action would be in the case of an 
emergency where the existing policies had to be overridden for 
the sake of the patient’s health). PRSIAS should have the capability 
to deduce whether a provided justification is valid. We will 
discuss this later in the paper. 
6. FEASIBILITY 
The main capabilities of the IAF are policy representation, policy 
storage and policy reasoning capabilities. The key challenge in 
implementing the IAF in a technical point of view is to fulfill 
these capabilities. In this section we will give an account as to 
how these capabilities are feasible through available semantic web 
technologies.  
As discussed in section 3, proper representation of policies is vital 
in information accountability. For our model we look to digital 
rights management (DRM) as a solution. Apart from their 
applications in copyright protection of media files, etc on the 
Internet, DRM technologies are becoming a prominent resource in 
protecting private information of individuals [21]. DRM has many 
similarities to the traditional access control model but differs in 
that they require information to remain protected even after access 
is granted to authorised users. DRM deals with usage control of a 
piece of information resource by authorised users. Each piece of 
information is protected by a usage license created by the digital 
rights holder. DRM can benefit e-health technologies by 
providing a means to manage the use of eHRs. Rights expression 
languages (REL) are a critical aspect of DRM systems. The Open 
Digital Rights Language (ODRL) version 2 [22] is based on XML 
and provides a syntax and semantics to express policies related to 
digital assets. We have chosen ODRL as the policy language for 
our model because it is independent of implementation constraints 
and it’s capable of expressing a wide range of policy-based 
information. 
6.1 Healthcare scenario 
Consider the following scenario. Gary has a comprehensive eHR. 
Gary has a list of trusted healthcare providers (health 
professionals) to whom he gives access to data in his eHR. Peter 
is Gary’s GP, Sandra is a dermatologist, Bill is a sexual health 
specialist and Matt is a mental health specialist who has treated 
Gary in the recent past. Gary can set privacy settings to govern the 
access to his eHR. A central health authority can also set access 
settings to patient’s eHR by considering the roles of each health 
professional. In addition to privacy and access policies, other 
constraints can be present in the eHR. One such policy can be a 
take control policy. In which an eHR holder may take control of 
their eHR at the age of 15 (which was previously controlled by a 
parent, legal guardian of authorised representative) and must take 
control at the age of 18. Such policies must accompany privacy 
and access policies in the eHR. 
6.1.1 Scenario 
After noticing a skin rash, Gary visits his trusted dermatologist 
Sandra for a check up. The preliminary examination reveals that 
Gary’s skin condition could be linked to a known sexually 
transmitted disease (STD). Gary does not have a sexual health 
specialist in his list of trusted health professionals. However, 
Sandra wants to share Gary’s details with a sexual health 
specialist, Bill, in order to get a specialists opinion on the 
situation. Bill has a default access level set by the health authority 
to be able to access patients’ sexual health details and 
dermatology details. Since Sandra is in Gary’s list of trusted HPs 
to be able to access Gary’s dermatology information, she can 
initiate a request to share Gary’s details with other health 
professionals. Gary, however, is notified of this action by Sandra. 
After Bill gets this request, he initiates a usage request to use the 
data for diagnosis purposes. At some point during or after this 
episode of care, Gary may include Bill to his list of trusted health 
professional. 
6.1.2 ODRL policies 
Gary allows Sandra to access his EHR but restricts her from 
accessing his sexual health details and mental health details. 
Below is an ODRL V2 XML instance of this policy. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" 
xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/privacy" uid="policy-use-ehr" 
conflict="o:prohibit"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:gary" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" 
role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:healthCare"/> 
  </o:permission> 
  <o:prohibition> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:gary" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" 
role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:sexualHealthCare"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:mentalHealthCare"/> 
  </o:prohibition> 
</o:policy> 
The conflict attribute of the policy above is set to “prohibit” 
indicating that prohibitions take precedence in the policy. The 
health authority can set an access policy for Sandra which is given 
below. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= " http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" 
xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/agreement" uid="policy-use-ehr"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:health:authority" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" 
role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare"> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:sexualHealthCare"> 
  </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
The health authority is responsible for setting default access 
policies for healthcare roles, in this case for the role of a 
dermatologist. In the policy above HA gives Sandra the 
permission to access Gary’s dermatology details and sexual health 
details. Note here that Gary’s settings prohibit Sandra from 
accessing his sexual health details. But we assume a hypothetical 
scenario where a relationship between skin conditions and STDs 
exist, and every dermatologist should have access to the patient’s 
sexual health details. The health authority is aware of this fact and 
allows all dermatologists access to patients sexual health details. 
According to the access control protocol in section 3, the settings 
by the health authority always prevail over patient settings. The 
final policy will be a combination of the two policies and hence 
the requirement for PASIS in the IAF. The amalgamated policy for 
Sandra is given below. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= " http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" 
xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/privacy" uid="policy-use-ehr" 
conflict="o:prohibit"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:gary" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" 
role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:healthCare"/> 
  </o:permission> 
  <o:prohibition> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:gary" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" 
role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:mentalHealthCare"/> 
  </o:prohibition> 
</o:policy> 
This final policy is stored in PSIAS and is used by other services. 
Updates are done to the policies in PSIAS accordingly. 
Information sharing is an important aspect of healthcare and is 
facilitated in the IAF. HPs who are already in the ACL can initiate 
sharing requests. 
<o:policy xmlns:o="http://odrl.net/2.0" 
xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/request" uid="policy-share-ehr"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:sandra" 
role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:share"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare"> 
    <o:constraint name="o:recipient" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:bill"> 
  </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
In the policy above Sandra initiates a request to share Gary’s 
dermatology details with Bill. Bill accepts this request by lodging 
the following access request to read Gary’s dermatology details. 
Requests resulting from sharing requests are allowed (holding to 
general access policies) since the initial request was from a HP 
already in the ACL. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= " http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" 
xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/request" uid="policy-use-ehr"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:gary" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:sexualHealth:bill" 
role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare"> 
  </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
Using ODRL we can formulate the different types of policies 
within the eHR system. But the Challenge lies in using ODRL in 
the Semantic Web domain. Next we will look at how we can use 
ODRL in conjunction with semantic web technologies and how 
we can attain the capabilities proposed for the IAF. 
6.2 ODRL in the Semantic Web 
ODRL is a solution to move DRM to the Internet. But in order to 
enforce the semantics of the policies in conjunction with ODRL, a 
corresponding ontology is required. At the time of writing such 
ontology was not present. The ontology for the policies can be 
represented using OWL. Even though a comprehensive ontology 
for ODRL V2 is required for an end result, we will not present 
one in this paper. Such ontologies allow us to achieve the 
capabilities proposed in the IAF. 
EPSIS contains an ontology representing the relationships between 
the eHR data themselves and eHR data and the intended purposes. 
This ontology together with a comprehensive medical ontology 
enables us to infer facts otherwise would not be available. For 
example, the presence of the fact that Gary has a particular allergy 
in the EPSIS can lead to the inference of the fact that a particular 
medication has the tendency to be harmful to Gary. This fact 
would not have been available to the eHR system without a 
specific external input saying so or if Gary has had an illness 
which is usually treated by this particular medication. The 
inferences are updated with new data and facts available to EPSIS. 
The policies in PSIAS are stored in RDF with vocabularies from 
the ODRL ontology. The queries made by UISP and PRSIAS are 
made in a RDF query language like SPARQL [23]. Data stored in 
PATLIAS is also in RDF allowing mining to be done using 
SPARQL. Together with these services, PRSIAF allow us (with a 
suitable natural language translation middleware) to process 
queries such as “Why did Sandra read my sexual health details?” 
by Gary. Similarly, Sandra will be able to justify why she read 
Gary’s sexual health details. The validity of the justification is 
determined after mining the PATLIAS and PSIAS. A provided 
justification holds if the facts confirm with the available 
knowledge. Note here that as mentioned above, the patient can 
only lodge an inquiry query if there has been a possible misuse of 
data i.e. some underlying policy has been violated by the user. 
The justification is on why the user has done so. The ontologies 
defined enable us to infer facts that validate the justification. For 
example, in an emergency situation the treating health 
professional will access all necessary information from the eHR 
regardless of the privacy and access policies. This will be 
recorded in PATLIAS. For any inquiry made by the patient to 
clarify data usage related to this episode of care, the fact that the 
incident was considered and recorded as an emergency would 
validate the justifications given by the health professionals. 
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We have presented an information accountability framework 
(IAF) for e-health which adheres to information accountability 
(IA) principles and requirements of stakeholders in healthcare. IA 
is a term better defined contextually rather than in a general sense. 
We focused on the healthcare context and treated each IA 
principle accordingly. The requirements of the healthcare domain 
which we considered are mainly privacy requirements of patients 
and access and usage requirements of health professionals. 
Amongst others these carry the most potential to hinder the 
development of e-health systems and are the main concerns of 
consumers of those systems. In any accountability system, policy 
representation is clearly a key aspect. In our model we used 
ODRL as the policy language and discussed how we can represent 
the different privacy and access policies in the IAF. Policy 
reasoning is the other key factor in information accountability. 
Currently the only technologies that provide such capabilities and 
are readily available are semantic web technologies. We discussed 
how we can use semantic web technologies such as OWL 
ontologies and RDF to develop the proposed IAF. It is clear that 
developing a comprehensive eHR system with an IAF is an 
immense undertaking. But with the level of technology currently 
at the disposal of developers it is without a doubt feasible task. 
In e-health, accountability systems will enable the use of health 
information in a more free but controlled manner. This will allow 
health professionals to access relevant information at any point 
without the restrictions currently present in e-health solutions. We 
believe that the presence of the IAF will increase the confidence 
of the patients towards e-health systems and would lead to e-
health systems being better adopted. Barriers still exist in our 
venture towards building a working system with the capabilities 
introduced. We are currently working on demonstrating the 
presented IAF using the technologies discussed. At the time of 
writing the development of the aforementioned ontologies are 
ongoing. Building a comprehensive eHR system is not our goal. 
Our goal is to show that with IA capabilities the current state of e-
health systems can be improved to a more open and healthcare 
oriented state from a security and privacy oriented state. 
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